In Rio Grande do Sul, a “state of collective exaltation” appeared, in which a large part of the population was in the streets, especially around the Piratini Palace. Many volunteered to defend the state government. [68] In the Mata-borrão exhibition pavilion, located at the corner of Avenida Borges de Medeiros and Andrade Neves, the “Central Committee of the Democratic Resistance Movement” was founded, which brings together dozens of committees. On the night of August 30, it had about 45,000 volunteers. The civilian population made their vehicles available to the cause and formed the “fleet of legality”. There were also thousands of volunteers on loyalist committees. Flying clubs, for example, patrolled the border with their Teco-tecos. The Aliado Hotel was made available as a hospital for fighters, volunteers who donated blood and women who posed as caregivers. [69] SILVEIRA, Norberto da. Legality news: 1961/1991. Porto Alegre: NS Assessoria em Comunicação Ltda., 1991. Machado Lopes had only the “Unified Command of the Armed Forces of the South”: the Third Army, a minority of the Air Force (Air Zone V), the Military Brigade and the public armed forces. The BM was removed from “Mr.

Leonel Brizola agitated” when he had his commander, Colonel Diomário Morgen, integrated into the General Staff. The hypothesis of the campaign was to invade São Paulo on three axes and advance into Rio de Janeiro. The expected benefits were the defecations of the enemy and the support of the people; Machado Lopes hoped that public opinion in São Paulo would “be reborn in 1932.” [94] [133] The Third Army was the largest, but the I at Guanabara was also strong and had the armored division and paratroopers. [97] However, according to Moniz Bandeira, there were two American directives based on Admiral Heck`s testimony. On the one hand, the Pentagon and the ClA supported the coup. On the other hand, the State Department and John F. Kennedy`s White House were against it, and the military ministers received a report threatening to cut off financial aid to Brazil if the estate was not honored, which influenced their adoption of Goulart`s founding. At that time, the policy adopted at the Punta del Este Conference was not to support countries with dictatorships, a legislative power that does not function or the absence of periodic elections.

A rule that was created against Cuba, but that could be applied to Brazil. [172] The literature agrees that the White House was against the impediment of the inauguration, but there is a documentary document that Kennedy disapproved of Goulart after declaring on August 31 that “we don`t want this guy for four and a half years.” However, the U.S. government refused to take advantage of Dionysius when it noted his lack of military support. [173] (UFRGS) The so-called “Legality Campaign,” which took place in Rio Grande do Sul in late August 1961, was a consequence of: the campaign or struggle for legality was the dispute that took place in the military and political media over the inauguration of João Goulart into the presidential succession after the resignation of Jânio Quadros. The conservative wings of the military said they would not accept possession of Jango, who was considered a communist, which provoked the reaction of another legalistic wing of the military defending the property of the then vice president. To prevent the conflict from turning into a civil war, it was agreed that João Goulart would take over the presidency, but with limited powers over the implementation of parliamentarism. Carlos Lacerda acknowledged the appeal, especially for the middle class, of Jânio`s election promises, which were based on fighting corruption, controlling inflation, reducing the cost of living, restricting spending and public austerity measures. Under his influence, the National Democratic Union (UDN) backed the candidate to win the election – previously dominated by the PSD and PTB. [4] [5] Jânio`s anti-political message, expressing deep contempt for mainstream politicians, attracted the inflation-ridden middle-class electorate, who saw the candidate as the embodiment of the energetic manager and was able to effectively manage the Brazilian economy.

[4] The decision was difficult for Machado Lopes, who was linked to the hierarchy, but relieved by the influence of his already loyalist subordinates, the realization that they would become enemies if Dionysius was obeyed, the uprising that would be unleashed, the absurdity of the order to attack the Gaucho government and the support of the population that would come to them. In response, a congressional committee began investigating the president`s investigations. The vice president himself appeared in a report published from one of the investigations. He accused the government of publishing it for political purposes and continued to stay away from the president. [7] (Cesgranrio) After the resignation of Jânio Quadros on August 25, 1961, the military ministers considered it embarrassing for national security that President João Goulart (then abroad) returned to Brazil to take office. Fearing the outbreak of civil war or military coups, Congress circumvented the crisis by passing an amendment to the 1946 Constitution to limit the powers of the new president. For this additional law: On August 25, 1961, while Goulart was leading a Brazilian trade mission to the People`s Republic of China, President Jânio resigned. The previous decision is not understood, but it was probably a political maneuver to come back with more power and overcome the political impasse it had with Congress. It was expected that with the rejection of his deputy – elected on the other hand, by the peculiarity of the political system of the time – the anti-communist army, which Goulart had already rejected, as well as the pressure of the population, would reverse the resignation. However, the maneuver failed and Jânio left the country.

In his place, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Ranieri Mazzilli, took over on an interim basis, but royal power was in the hands of the military ministers, Marshal Odílio Denys, of War, Vice Admiral Sílvio Heck of the Navy and Air Brigadier Gabriel Grün Moss of the Air Force. The three, who in practice formed a junta, broke the legal system and vetoed the inauguration of the vice president with the intention of calling new elections.